Donnellan: “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. TWO USES OF . sentence “ Keith asserted that Smith’s murderer is insane.” To capture the. Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. Due Feb 13, by 10am; Points 5; Submitting a discussion post; Available after Feb 2, at 12am. Keith Donnellan, Joseph Almog, and Paolo Leonardi function is the referential use of definite description, in which the speaker uses it to refer to something.
|Published (Last):||19 August 2010|
|PDF File Size:||11.95 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||14.54 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
According to Soames, there are contexts of utterance and worlds of evaluation where 14a is true but 14b is false.
Indeed, as languages evolve, their robust inflectional system gives way to anr dependent language Leiss One problem has to do with the fact that there is often no single shared description for certain fictions.
Hopefully, there was only one student involved.
He argued that definite descriptions can be used in at least two different ways. What it allows us defniite do is to make sense of cases where we employ nondenoting pronouns in negative existentials, belief reports, and fictional contexts.
This page was last edited on 5 Septemberat And, as Donnellan is at pains to emphasize pp. The idea that uniqueness is presupposed is suggested in work by Heimvon FintelElbourneteference, Rothschildand Schoubye What is asserted is simply an open sentence! Abbotrecognizes rfeerence cases like this are false, but argues that what is going on is that the speakers are engaged in hyperbole.
Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”
Some philosophers and linguists treat descriptions as dnonellan expressions, others have treated them as quantificational expressions, and some have treated them as predicational expressions. The alternative, of course, is to hold that the stressed descriptios determiner is indicating familiarity or salience.
Finally, Donnellan and Kripke both argued that the Descriptive Theory of Names suffers from an important epistemological defect. Utterances of meaningful sentences may be true or false or, if here is a presupposition failure, they may be neither. So for example, we read: Cambridge University Press, — From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. According to the unified analysis of descriptions, what Detective Brown literally expresses is not the idea that there was a unique murderer of Smith who is insane.
Their proposal is applicable to all quantified expressions; not just the theory of descriptions. Cambridge University Press, 29— Von Fintel and Yablo offer an explanation for these minimal pairs that draws upon the nature of belief revision.
We typically believe that Anna Karenina was written by Tolstoy, who was not and is not the king of France, but do we really have a belief in which the king of France was not a bald Nazi? Is this description really sufficient to uniquely identify the object in question?
The Varieties of ReferenceOxford: Here the basic idea is that the content of a description picks out different contents in different possible worlds. Donnelln one respect, of course, the accounts are very different—Russell takes indefinite descriptions to be existential quantifiers, while the DRT accounts take them to be akin to free variables.
Heim observed that 20 unlike 19 implies that a unique man entered the room and that 20 will therefore be false if two men enter the room. Dummett ; —, and Sosa ; ch. Does this whole debate come down to a case of intuition swapping?
We saw that singular, plural, mass, and generic descriptions can be unified; can we perform the same unification trick here? Worse, what is the principled basis by which we weight the importance of the properties in the bundle? Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of descriptiions monograph in OSO for personal refreence for details see www. Contrast both with the following, which seems entirely natural. This class of problems, sometimes called bishop sentenceshas yielded a number of proposed solutions.
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Ordinarily, when philosophers talk about descriptions, they have two kinds of expressions in mind: Whatever the ultimate disposition of these cases, it is fair to say that there are more issues here than whether pronouns are to be treated as standing ans for definite descriptions or indefinite descriptions.